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1 Introduction
Mathematical knowledge is often seen as a special kind of knowledge, namely
as the very paradigm of certainty, universality, objectivity, or exactness. To
some, it seems that in contrast to other forms of knowledge—including
natural scientific knowledge—mathematical results are absolutely certain,
indubitable, and infallible. For example, Pythagoras’s Theorem was estab-
lished over two millennia ago and still holds today. What other forms of
activity can claim such definitive achievements?
Whenever someone wants an example of certitude and exactness of
reasoning, he appeals to mathematics. (Kline, 1980, p. 4)
Mathematical results seem to be the paradigms of precision, rigor and
certainty—from elementary theorems about numbers and geometric
figures to the complex constructions of functional analysis and set
theory. (Tymoczko, 1986, p. xiii)
[. . . ] mathematical knowledge is timeless, although we may discover
new theories and truths to add; it is superhuman and ahistorical, for
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the history of mathematics is irrelevant to the nature and justifica-
tion of mathematical knowledge; it is pure isolated knowledge, which
happens to be useful because of its universal validity; it is value-free
and culture-free, for the same reason. (Ernest, 1996, p. 807)
What is that distinguishes mathematical knowledge from other forms
of knowledge? Students of all ages, whether they are studying alge-
bra, trigonometry, geometry, or calculus, would agree on one universal
theme: Mathematics is beyond doubt. A mathematical statement is
either right or wrong, and any true statement can be proven. More-
over, once it is proved true, it can never later turn out to be false.
(Henrion, 1997, p. 235)
Mathematical reasoning can also seem to constitute a special form of
reasoning, which is encapsulated in mathematical proofs. Since proofs have
a logical, strict, and formal character, it may be that the reasoning that
creates them shares these characteristics. Mathematical reasoning has thus
been likened to the functioning of a machine, which relentlessly follows a
set of (mechanical) rules. Rota has called this the “machine grinder” con-
ception, which conceives of mathematicians as driven by logical necessity
(rather than imagination) and thus wholly mechanical in their “grinding
out”, solely according to the dictates of formal logic, successor proposition
after successor proposition until arriving at a seemingly irresistible conclu-
sion:
According to this myth, the process of reasoning is viewed as the
functioning of a vending machine which, by setting into motion a
complex mechanism reminiscent of those we saw in Charlie Chaplin’s
film Modern Times, grinds out solutions to problems, like so many
Hershey bars. (Rota, 1991, p. 175)
However, are these views of mathematics actually correct or are they only
myths? Though some apparently accept these myths, there is also much
scepticism about them, and a variety of scholars from the humanities and
social sciences have challenged these myths, denying the absolute certainty
of mathematics and the formal character of mathematical reasoning.
Historians of mathematics have pointed to disagreements and contro-
versies in the history of mathematics, some going so far as to argue that
mathematics—like the experimental sciences—goes through Kuhnian“revo-
lutions”(Gillies, 1992). The most influential contribution has been Lakatos’s
(1976) Proofs and Refutations, in which Lakatos demonstrates that mathe-
matical concepts (such as “polyhedron”) are not permanently fixed, but can
have a history of continuous modification. The same argument has been
applied to the very standards and forms of mathematical proof, which have
been shown not to be eternally fixed but subject to historical and cultural
changes (Kleiner, 1991; MacKenzie, 2001).
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A variety of philosophers have questioned the status of mathemati-
cal knowledge as absolutely certain (e.g., Quine, 1960; Wittgenstein, 1978;
Lakatos, 1976; Kitcher, 1983; Tymoczko, 1986; Maddy, 1990). Often they
have done so by drawing philosophical conclusions from specific mathemat-
ical developments, in particular, the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries
at the end of the 19th century and the production of Go¨del’s Incomplete-
ness Theorems in the early 20th century. Non-Euclidean geometries brought
into question the view that the certainty of mathematics resides in its cor-
respondence to reality, while Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems shook the
belief that it would be possible to finally (and formally) prove the consis-
tency of mathematics from a finite number of assumptions.
Rather than emphasizing the certainty of mathematics, researchers have
thus started to talk of mathematics as “fallible”, “uncertain”, and “contin-
gent”(e.g., Lakatos, 1976; Kline, 1980; Davis and Hersh, 1981; Ernest, 1998).
Mathematical proofs are—and remain—open to revision (as is evidenced by
the fact that some of them have been revised) and therefore cannot have
been statements of absolute and eternal truths (since these could not pos-
sibly be questioned). This has led some researchers to argue that the belief
in the (absolute) certainty of mathematics is only a reflection of (various)
myths about mathematics. For example, Davis and Hersh (1981, p. 322)
argue that the traditional picture of mathematics constitutes “the Euclid
myth”; Hersh (1991, p. 130) maintains that myths about the unity, objec-
tivity, universality, and certainty are widely spread; Dowling (2001, p. 21)
also claims that many people subscribe to the “myth of certainty”, which for
Borba and Skovsmose (1997) actually constitutes an “ideology of certainty”.
However, despite the fact that the “loss of certainty” (Kline, 1980) oc-
curred over a century ago, it is also assumed by researchers that these myths
still persist and that belief in them is widespread. Some researchers have
tried to explain the existence of these myths by arguing that they originate
in the way that mathematics has been, and still is, presented and taught
in journals, textbooks, lectures, and classrooms. That is to say, it may be
that mathematical knowledge is communicated and taught so as to make it
seem that it is absolutely certain. The impression that mathematical results
are certain may thus be a result of the fact that mathematical publications
typically contain only the final results of mathematical investigations, i.e.,
typically do not mention all the things that didn’t work out, the reasons
why certain things were tried, or the ways in which the final theorem was
modified during the course of proving. In particular, the modern definition-
theorem-proof format of presenting mathematics (cf. Davis and Hersh, 1981,
p. 151; Thurston, 1994, p. 163; Weber, 2004, p. 116) could be said to mis-
represent the order in which mathematicians initially work out their proofs
(if the format of definition-proof-theorem is to be understood as giving an
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order of presentation that reproduces the order of the mathematician’s in-
vestigative reasoning, i.e., as suggesting that the mathematician started
with clearly stated definitions, used those to form a conjecture, and then
just wrote out the successive steps of the proof that are logically implied in
the initial definition unhesitatingly one after the other).
Borasi (1992, p. 161), for example, suspects that people may mistake
the way that mathematical results are presented as an account of how they
were found:
Perhaps because textbooks and lectures tend to present mathematical
results in a “neat” and organized way, few people realize that those
results have not always been achieved in a straightforward manner.
(Borasi, 1992, p. 161)
Crawford et al. (1998, p. 466) argue that the way that mathematics is
presented to students hides important information and thereby misrepre-
sents the nature of mathematics:
Most students learn mathematics at school and university in a com-
petitive environment where mathematics is presented as a finished
and polished product and where the assessment encourages students
to reproduce authoritative statements of fact [. . .]. In presenting
mathematics in this way, students are provided with mathematical
information about concepts, proofs, techniques and skills, but the
processes which created this information are hidden [. . .]. The lack of
awareness of these creative processes makes it difficult for students to
experience mathematics as personally meaningful and misrepresents
the nature of mathematics itself.
Powell and Brantlinger (2008, p. 428) argue that “the struggle of dis-
covery is [. . .] usually missing from the narratives [students] read in math-
ematics texts”. Livingston (2006, p. 60) wonders whether since proofs only
exhibit“the reasoning that someone, or some others, had discovered, but not
how they had gone about discovering it”, students may mistake “the logic
of a proof [as] the justification of how it was found”. Similar considerations
lead Campbell to speak of the “curse of Euclid”:
Euclid’s axiomatic procedure is a breakthrough; it is a procedure
for the unification of material. It allows key assumptions to stand
out. It allows for systematic procedures of verification. But so long
as students are misled into believing that the polished jewels are the
actual reasoning rather than the end product of reasoning, just so long
will it be that Euclidean geometry will remain a curse rather than a
blessing to the teaching of reasoning. (Campbell, 1976, p. 342)
Ernest suggests that textbooks therefore constitute a “pedagogical falsi-
fication” of mathematical reasoning:
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Lakatos (1976) and others have criticized the pedagogical falsification
perpetrated by the standard practice of presenting advanced learn-
ers with the sanitized outcomes of mathematical enquiry. Typically
advanced mathematics text books conceal the processes of knowl-
edge construction by inverting or radically modifying the sequence
of transformations used in mathematical invention, for presentational
purposes. The outcome may be elegant texts meant for public con-
sumption, but they also generate learning obstacles through this re-
formulation and inversion. (Ernest, 2008, p. 67)
Overall, these quotations demonstrate a common—though vague and
variable—sense that the way that mathematics is presented and written, in
particular, the stress on established results (emphasising certainty) and on
proofs (emphasising formal rules), may be an important source for the myth
of mathematics as absolutely certain and as the province of special kinds
of individuals with distinctive powers of reason. These impressions may be
reinforced by the style in which mathematical reports are written, which
could be described as “impersonal”, “objective”, or “authoritative” (Davis
and Hersh, 1981, p. 36; Morgan, 1998, p. 11; Burton and Morgan, 2000,
p. 435) and which could be seen to obliterate the understanding that proofs
must be somebody’s creation (thus conveying the impression that mathe-
matics is a superhuman achievement with results appearing as if “untouched
by human hand”).
In order to demythologize mathematics, researchers have contrasted the
way that mathematics is written and presented with how it is actually done
and practiced. In other words, they have pointed to the differences be-
tween finished mathematics (which can be found in textbooks or lectures)
and mathematics-in-the-making (when researchers are still in the process of
coming up with the various definitions, theorems, and proofs). It has been
argued that when the attention is turned to mathematics-in-the-making, a
very different view of mathematics emerges, one that is much less alienating
and therefore more welcoming to outsiders. This argumentative strategy is
nicely captured in an article by Reuben Hersh.
2 Mathematics as divided into a front and a back
In Mathematics has a front and a back (1991), Hersh adopts Goffman’s
(1959) dramaturgical model of social establishments as divided between a
“front” and a “back” region to mathematics.1 In Goffman’s terms, differ-
ent areas of social establishments are separated by the need to project and
sustain public impressions. A (usually more elevated) image is projected
by conduct in the “front” region, since it is this area to which the audience
is allowed access. However, what goes on in the “front” is supported by
1Cf. also Hersh (1997, pp. 35–39).
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“backstage” activities, which include all sorts of things that are incongruous
with (and usually diminishing of) the image being projected by the front
and from which the audience—its public—is excluded. In a restaurant, for
example, the “front” is the dining area where customers are offered hygieni-
cally presented dishes, which, of course, are the product of various (perhaps
unhygienic) activities in the kitchen “backstage”. Furthermore, while the
dining area is often quiet, neat, and tidy, the kitchen is smelly, noisy, and
chaotic (and there may be real discrepancies between the politely subordi-
nate conduct of waiting staff in view of the customers and the disrespect,
even contempt, on show backstage).
Hersh uses Goffman’s conception of the “front” and the “back” to distin-
guish between the products of mathematical activities (finished mathemat-
ics) and the processes of mathematics (mathematics-in-the-making):
[. . .] the “front” of mathematics is mathematics in “finished” form,
as it is presented to the public in classroom, textbooks, and jour-
nals. The “back”would be mathematics as it appears among working
mathematicians, in informal settings, told to one another in an office
behind closed doors.
Compared to“backstage”mathematics,“front”mathematics is formal,
precise, ordered and abstract. It is separated clearly into definitions,
theorems, and remarks. To every question there is an answer, or at
least, a conspicuous label: “open question”. The goal is stated at the
beginning of each chapter, and attained at the end.
Compared to “front” mathematics, mathematics “in back” is frag-
mentary, informal, intuitive, tentative. We try this or that, we say
“maybe” or “it looks like”. (Hersh, 1991, p. 128)
Not only are there differences between the “front” and the “back”, but
the audience is typically not allowed access to the “back”. In other words,
the activities that go on in the back are being kept from the audience:
So its “front” and “back” will be particular kinds or aspects of math-
ematical activity, the public and private, or the part offered to “out-
siders” (down front) versus the part normally restricted to “insiders”
(backstage). (Hersh, 1991, p. 128)
Hersh takes the separation into a “front” and “back” to be the source for
the various myths associated with mathematics. Although mathematicians
themselves may well know that their work does not conform to this “official”
image of mathematics,2 they nonetheless sustain the mythology through
their publication arrangements and educational practices:
2Other authors suppose that mathematicians themselves may have swallowed the
myths or ideology about their own discipline.
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[. . .] the front/back separation makes possible the preservation of a
myth [. . .]. By a myth we shall mean simply taking the performance
seen from up front at face value; failing to be aware that the perfor-
mance seen “up front” is created or concocted “behind the scenes” in
back. This myth, in many cases, adds to the customer’s enjoyment
of the performance; it may even be essential. [. . .] Mathematics, too,
has it myths. One of the unwritten criteria separating the professional
from the amateur, the insider from the outsider, is that the outsiders
are taken in (deceived), the insiders are not taken in. (Hersh, 1991,
p. 129)
And the point of these myths is to support the social institution of
mathematics:
By calling these beliefs myths, I am not declaring them to be false.
A myth need not be false to be a myth. The point is that it serves to
support or validate some social institution [. . . ].
[. . .] the unity, universality, objectivity, and certainty of mathematics
are beliefs that support and justify the institution of mathematics.
(For mathematics, which is an art and a science, is also an institu-
tion, with budgets, administrations, publications, conferences, rank,
status, awards, grants, etc.)
Part of the job of preparing mathematics for public presentation—
in print or in person—is to get rid of all the loose ends. If there is
disagreement whether a theorem has really been proved, then that
theorem will not be included in the text or the lecture course. The
standard style of expounding mathematics purges it of the personal,
the controversial, and the tentative, producing a work that acknowl-
edges little trace of humanity, either in the creators or the consumers.
This style is the mathematical version of “the front”.
Without it, the myths would lose much of their aura. If mathematics
were presented in the same style in which it is created, few would
believe in its universality, unity, certainty, or objectivity. (Hersh,
1991, p. 130–131)
There are a number of important aspects to Hersh’s adaption of Goff-
man’s front/back dramaturgical model to mathematics:
Firstly, Hersh suggests a strong segregation between how mathematics is
presented“in the front”and how it is actually done“in the back”, insinuating
that there might be two different kinds of mathematics (or mathematical
reasoning), one “formal” and “logical”, the other “informal” and “chaotic”.
As Ernest (2008, p. 66) restates Hersh:
As Hersh [. . .] has pointed out, mathematics (like the restaurant or
theatre) has a front and a back. What is displayed in the front for
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public viewing is tidied up according to strict norms of acceptability,
whereas the back (where the preparatory work is done) is often messy
and chaotic.
Secondly, Hersh clearly implies that this segregation of things done “in
the back” that are not stated in “front” presentations is a deliberate and
calculated move to keep that information from the audience:
The purpose of a separation between front and back is not just to keep
the customers from interfering with the cooking, it is also to keep the
customers from knowing too much about the cooking. (Hersh, 1991,
p. 129)
Thirdly, Hersh assumes that these activities are concealed or hidden
from the audience in the interest of protecting the institutional interests
of mathematics (because public awareness of them would transform, even
devalue, the high status assessment that allegedly follows from the “front”
presentations). Hersh speaks of the backstage activities as going on “behind
closed doors”, which suggests that what goes on there would be embarrassing
and would detract from the merits of mathematics if made public. Henrion
(1997, p. 249) similarly states:
One reason that the mathematics community is not more active in
conveying a more accurate picture of mathematics is that much of the
power and prestige of mathematics comes from its claim to certainty
and its image as an “exact science”.
The main thrust of Hersh’s front/back imagery is that mathematical re-
sults come to be treated by “the audience” or “the public” as if they could
not possibly be questioned, which gives mathematicians an awesome au-
thority. Those outside the mathematical community seem to have no choice
but to be obedient to whatever (mathematical) directives mathematicians
give them.3 Of course, no one supposes that this authority derives from the
personal characteristics of (balding, spotty, aging, shabby) mathematicians,
so it must stem from the nature of the mathematics itself. Hersh suggests
that the idea that mathematicians can’t possibly make mistakes is—at least
partially—a result of the way in which they present their work.
3According to David Bloor (e.g., 1976, 1994) many people (falsely) believe in the
universality of mathematics, i.e., assume that 2 + 2 must equal 4, and therefore do not
realize the conventional character of mathematics (for example, the use of a decimal
rather than binary notation). The aim of Bloor’s sociology of mathematics is thus to
demonstrate that mathematical propositions “could have been otherwise” and thereby to
show that no one is compelled to accept these propositions on the grounds that they could
not possibly be otherwise. These views are questioned in Greiffenhagen and Sharrock
(2006, 2009).
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The front/back scheme is invoked to debunk myths about mathematics
by showing that mathematical results and reasoning are less certain and
formal than they appear to be. This is done by showing that the reality of
mathematical practice relevantly deviates from its frontal presentation. Two
main strategies are at play. Firstly, it is held that the“front”evades mention
of mathematician’s controversies or doubts about their own or others’ work
(since preparing things for publication includes “to get rid of all the loose
ends” and to “purge [. . .] it of the personal and controversial, and the tenta-
tive”). Secondly, it is claimed that the course of a mathematical reasoning
is not an inexorable progression of inevitable steps. In other words, math-
ematicians reason heuristically (cf. Po´lya, 1945, 1954a,b) and often engage
in revision of their strategies for forming their sought after proof. Again,
Hersh suggests that because publications do not declare the tentativeness,
uncertainties, and informality associated with working on proofs, they are
occluding the fact that mathematical work is “contingent”, “revisable”, and
“fallible”. The upshot of Hersh’s argument seem s to be that if the audience
was admitted or given access to the “back” of mathematics—as, for exam-
ple, attempted in The Mathematical Experience (Davis and Hersh, 1981) or
What is Mathematics, Really? (Hersh, 1997)—they could be emancipated
from the mythologized picture of mathematics.
We are certainly not going to dispute that myths about mathematics do
circulate or that there are manifest differences between finished mathemat-
ics and mathematics-in-the-making. Neither do we address the “internal”
question of whether the historical shifts in ways that mathematics has been
written and presented have been an advantage or disadvantage to the disci-
pline. Mathematicians of course debate the “best” way of presenting math-
ematical results (cf. Ulam, 1976, pp. 276–277): Is it good to have “succinct”
papers that highlight the important points, or is it better to have “com-
plete” papers that deal with every detail? Should one start with a short
introduction that explains the motivations of trying to tackle the problem?
Should one just state the theorem and then present the proof? Burton and
Morgan (2000, p. 449), for example, quote a mathematician who calls for
changes:
I get annoyed with some of my collaborators and a lot of the papers
I am sent, which are definition, theorem, lemma, proof. That seems
to me to be appallingly bad. It is the sort of thing that no one is ever
going to want to read. I think it is important to grab the reader from
the opening sentence. Not “Let A be a class of algebras such that . . . ”
Change it to “This paper opens a new chapter in duality theory.”
Whatever the relevant pros and cons, these “internal” debates are dif-
ferent from the “external” question of whether the way in which mathe-
matical papers are written implicates mythical conceptions of mathematics
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(although there are connections insofar as styles are condemned for being
off-putting for imagined readerships). What we want to question is Hersh’s
suggestion that looking at mathematics “in the front” or “in the back” yields
two incongruent views of mathematics. We would therefore like to take a
closer look at two examples of mathematical practice, one taken from the
“front” and one from the “back”.
3 Towards a sociology of mathematics
It is surprising how very few detailed accounts of what mathematicians
do either in the “front” or in the “back” can be found in the literature.
The supposed features of “the front” as well as “the back” are typically
not derived from the close analysis of specific examples (e.g., a particular
lecture, textbook, or journal paper) or a corpus of them. This in turn
makes it difficult to check whether the descriptions of the “front” or “back”
are adequate.
There have been a number of very illuminating studies in the history
of mathematics (e.g., Lakatos, 1976; MacKenzie, 1999, 2001; Netz, 1999,
2009; Warwick, 2003), which have in particular demonstrated the changing
nature of many mathematical concepts (including the very notion of what
constitutes a mathematical proof). However, there are very few studies that
are based on observations of people engaged in doing mathematics. Even
the recent sociological studies of mathematical disciplines (e.g., Livingston,
1986, 1999, 2006; Merz and Knorr-Cetina, 1997; Rosental, 2003, 2008—cf.
also Greiffenhagen, 2008, 2010) are in no way straightforward ethnographies
comparable to the laboratory studies of the experimental sciences. Part of
the reason may be that it is simply more difficult to do such studies in the
case of “theoretical” or “conceptual” practice:
It is easy to study laboratory practices because they are so heavily
equipped, so evidently collective, so obviously material, so clearly sit-
uated in specific times and spaces, so hesitant and costly. But the
same is not true of mathematical practices: notions such as “demon-
stration”, “modelling”, “proving”, “calculating”, “formalism”, “abstrac-
tion”resist being shifted from the role of indisputable resources to that
of inspectable and accountable topics. It is as if we had no tool for
holding such notions under our eyes for more than a fleeting moment,
or simply no metalanguage with which to register them. (Latour,
2008, p. 444)
For the past six years, we have been conducting sociological studies of
mathematics, trying to find “perspicuous settings” in which different fea-
tures of mathematical practice become observable. We decided to focus on
situations in which mathematicians come together to discuss mathematics.
In a first study we observed and recorded three different graduate courses
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in mathematical logic for several months. In these lectures, an experienced
mathematician demonstrates mathematical expertise to novices, showing
what is treated as important and noteworthy about the “archive” of mathe-
matics. In a second study we attended for over a year the (almost) weekly
meetings between a supervisor and his doctoral students where they discuss
the problems that the student has been working on.
In our first study, we video-taped different lecturers giving graduate
lectures in mathematical logic (Figure 1). We do not here have the space
to give a detailed example (which we plan to do in a future paper), but can
only make some preliminary observations with respect to what one can see
when one looks closely what happens in mathematical lectures.
The lectures that we observed followed the typical definition-theorem-
proof format of presenting mathematics. Furthermore, like many lectures
in mathematics, what the lecturer wrote on the board to a large part corre-
sponded to the script that had been handed to students at the beginning of
the course. These lectures thus are a perspicuous example of mathematics
in the “front”, since what is communicated
is formal, precise, ordered and abstract. It is separated clearly into
definitions, theorems, and remarks. To every question there is an
answer, or at least, a conspicuous label: “open question”. The goal
is stated at the beginning of each chapter, and attained at the end.
(Hersh, 1991, p. 128)
However, in which sense does this style of presenting mathematics con-
tribute to myths about mathematics?
The first thing to notice is that lecturers did not simply copy the text
from the script to the board. Rather, lecturers spent the majority of the
time “working through” various proofs, typically without looking into the
script (except on a few occasions when they wanted to check a particular
detail or “got lost”), making a lot of additional comments, for example,
highlighting which steps in the proof were important or noteworthy, how
the steps depend on results established earlier, where the assumptions in
the theorem were used in the proof, and so on.
This at least partly explains why lecturers recited theorems and proofs to
students when the students could read them for themselves in the handouts
of the course. Learning mathematics does involve reading a lot of theorems
and proofs, but such reading requires work. Both lecturers and students are
aware that reading through a complex proof (once) does not equip students
with an (adequate) understanding of it. In that sense, a lecture is only the
first step in a process. Lecturers expect that students will spend additional
hours of individual study, together with attempting prescribed exercises,
in order to understand the materials covered in the lecture (lecturers also
expect that students are likely to have initial difficulties of understanding).
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Figure 1. Graduate lectures
As Davis and Hersh (1981, p. 281) observe, a mathematical proof is
only superficially comparable to a notated musical score and therefore only
seems to be accessible to sight reading. However, this is something that
students are very aware of. Although these students were still less than
fully qualified practitioners, it is difficult to see how they would get a wrong
picture of mathematics from the particular style in which the materials were
presented in these lectures (a style, which does not differ from a first-year
undergraduate course).
Furthermore, it is important to note that lecturers did not purport
to give a report (in the form of a historical, sociological or even anecdo-
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tal description) on how the various theorems, definitions, or proofs were
“found”. Instead, lecturers “simply” exhibited how particular theorems or
proofs “work” regardless of how they were found. The emphasis in these lec-
tures was on intelligibility, not truthful historical reporting. The comments
of lecturers were designed to make the various theorems and proofs intelligi-
ble to students, independently of knowing much, if any, biographical detail
of the authors or anything about the extended and detailed work that went
into developing the results. Although lecturers did not explicitly mention
that the definitions, theorems, and proofs do not “fall from the sky” (but
are the result of revisions, false avenues, etc.), this does not mean that they
were “hiding” this from students. Students may have been frustrated that
they failed to understand how a particular proof works or that they failed to
solve some of the exercise problems. Even so, it would be strange to suppose
that students as a consequence of the“formal, precise, ordered and abstract”
way in which the results were presented in these lectures believed that it
was possible for the originators of these results to achieve them without any
effort or by applying a “mechanistic” procedure.
In sum, a careful consideration of looking at a concrete example of math-
ematics “in the front” (here: a mathematical lecture) shows that it does not
necessarily lead to any of the myths about mathematics described by Hersh.
In a second study, we attended the weekly meetings between a supervi-
sor and his doctoral students (Figure 2). In these sessions, the supervisor
would discuss the work of the student, sometimes on the basis of some ma-
terials that the student had sent to the supervisor prior to the meeting.
At other times, the student would provide an oral account of what he had
been working on—which typically involved explaining why and where he did
get “stuck” (cf. Merz and Knorr-Cetina, 1997)—and the supervisor would
respond by making various suggestions on how the student could proceed.
The discourse in these meetings was indeed very different from that in the
lectures and constitutes a good example of mathematics“in the back”, which
is described by Hersh (1991, p. 128) as “fragmentary, informal, intuitive,
tentative. We try this or that, we say ‘maybe’ or ‘it looks like’ ”.
In these sessions, neither the supervisor nor the student would write
down fully worked out proofs on the board (in fact, if the student had sub-
mitted a proof which was deemed to be complete-for-all-practical-purposes
they typically did not talk further about it, but the conversation would
move on to what could be done next, i.e., how to make further progress
building on what they had proved so far). Rather than presenting finished
mathematics, the supervisor and doctoral student used the board as a fo-
cus for their discussions, a place to sketch out ideas, conjectures, hunches,
reasons for trying this or that.
The main aim of their meetings was to try out ideas, fully aware that
they would only be able to work them out initially and partially in the
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Figure 2. Supervision meetings
meeting. Sometimes it transpired relatively quickly that an idea would
definitely not work and should be abandoned. However, more often than
not, the idea remained to be worked through more systematically and there
remained uncertainty as to whether a promising idea would work out in
detail. Another aim of these meetings thus was to make assessments with
respect to which problems it would be worth pursuing. These researchers,
like other practical decision makers, were sensitive to economising their
investment of effort as well as with the pacing of their inquiries, and so thecheck sentence
decision as to whether to attempt to construct a proof or to search for a
counterexample was to be considered in terms of the estimated likelihood
that one, rather than the other, would pay off, and the amount of time that
would need to be invested in getting out the correct conclusion.
Their discussions in these sessions were often not decisive, but this did
not mean that there was a permanent tentativeness about determining
whether an idea would or would not work in detail. Further additional
work would often give a firm verdict (although some ideas remained unre-
solved either way). Although their work could be described as “intuitive”,
this does not mean that what they were doing resembled anything like ar-
bitrary guesswork. One of the dangers of attacking a deductivist picture of
mathematics is to suggest the opposite extreme. Experienced mathemati-
cians do make guesses and rely on intuition, but do this on the basis of a
vast armoury of accepted techniques and tricks.
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Although the conversation in this setting did not resemble the discourse
in the lecture, it was constantly oriented towards it. The aim was to come up
with theorems and proofs that could and, if successful, would be presented
in the style of the lecture. Conversely, both researchers constantly made use
of the results and techniques that were taught in the lectures, since these
are amongst the stock resources of the field. In that sense, it is difficult to
see how the “back” was strongly separated from the “front”, since the com-
position of their new proof is done through—in part—the use of results and
techniques drawn from already established proofs (i.e., their innovation “in
the back” involved the application of what they had learned from studying
proofs “in the front”). In other words, there was not any simple discon-
tinuity between “rough ideas that are good enough for our mathematical
purposes” and the “formal, tidy presentation necessary to meet the needs of
the audience”, because, as far as these researchers were concerned, if they
only had a rough idea, they did not necessarily have anything that could be
presented in the format of a lecture.
In sum, looking at a concrete example of mathematics “in the back”
(here: a meeting between a supervisor and his doctoral student) shows that
it is not fundamentally different from mathematics “in the front”.
4 Conclusion
Both Goffman and Hersh seem to suggest that the separation of a setting
into a “front” and “back” can serve as the basis of various myths. Goffman
writes that in the “front”
[. . . ] errors and mistakes are often corrected before the performance
takes place, while telltale signs that errors have been made and cor-
rected are themselves concealed. In this way an impression of infalli-
bility, so important in many presentations, is maintained. (Goffman,
1959, p. 52)
While Hersh (1991, p. 127) states that “[a]cceptance of these myths
[unity, objectivity, universality, and certainty] is related to whether one is
located in the front or the back” and that “[m]ainstream philosophy doesn’t
know that mathematics has a back” (Hersh, 1997, p. 36).
We would be foolish to pretend that questionable conceptions about
mathematics do not circulate (especially within philosophy) or that they
cannot change over time (“fallibilism” was not a term widely used even in
the nineteenth century). At the same time, since amongst the mythologisers
are included Russell, Hilbert, and Bourbaki (and formalists generally), all
of whom knew how to do advanced mathematics, we do not see that it is
a lack of exposure to backregions that makes people susceptible to these
mythical conceptions. People may have wrong ideas about mathematics,
but we have questioned whether these are a creation of external features of
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the way in which textbooks, lectures, and other publications are set out in
public formats, and have suggested that there is no compelling reason to
think they are.
We have been arguing that whatever the origin of the various myths
of mathematics might be, it cannot be the necessity to segregate one form
of mathematical reasoning (that which mathematicians present themselves
as using) from another (that which mathematicians really employ to do
mathematics) so as to prevent “the audience” becoming aware of the differ-
ence. Rather than being helpful, the application of the front/back metaphor
exaggerates the discontinuities between mathematics-in-publications and
mathematics-in-the-making. Whilst Hersh might laudably aim to demys-
tify mathematics, there is in our view the risk that in the end he will only
service re-mystification of it.
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